



EUROPEAN PATENT APPLICATION

(43) Date of publication:
07.10.1998 Bulletin 1998/41

(51) Int Cl.⁶: H04L 9/08

(21) Application number: 98302438.1

(22) Date of filing: 30.03.1998

(84) Designated Contracting States:
AT BE CH DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT LI LU MC
NL PT SE
Designated Extension States:
AL LT LV MK RO SI

(30) Priority: 31.03.1997 JP 800081/97

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
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(54) Encrypted data recovery method using split storage key and system thereof

(57) When a secret is encrypted and stored, it is necessary to provide for a countermeasure for lost key (key recovery system). In the present invention, a key recovery system for an enveloped data format in which a common key is used to encrypt a plaintext (secret) and a user's public key is used to encrypt the common key and attached to an encrypted text is provided. In the present invention, only the common key is decrypted (203, 221) to recover the secret (204) without reconstruction of split secret keys kept in a plurality of key storage apparatuses.

FIG.2



Description

1. COMMON KEY ENCRYPTION, PUBLIC KEY ENCRYPTION AND ENVELOPED DATA

5 There are two cryptograph systems including a common key encryption system and a public key encryption system. As keys used in the cryptograph systems, there are an encryption key for encrypting a plaintext and a decryption key for decrypting a ciphertext.

The common key encryption system includes common encryption and decryption keys and particularly is suitable for an application in which a file is encrypted to keep a secret.

10 The public key encryption system includes different encryption and decryption keys. A user produces a pair of keys including a public key and a secret key. The public key is an encryption key and the secret key is a decryption key. Particularly, the public key encryption system is suitable for an application in which a communication text is encrypted to keep a secret. A transmitting party uses a receiving party's public key to encrypt a communication text and only the receiving party which is an owner of a secret key can use the secret key to decrypt the communication text.

15 When a user who makes encryption and a user who makes decryption are different, the common key encryption system requires to provide a mechanism for delivering the common key in safety. The public key encryption system merely opens the public key conveniently. On the other hand, the public key encryption system has a demerit that processing performance for encryption and decryption is inferior as compared with the common key encryption system.

Computers connected through a network are used to realize a system in which secret information is owned jointly. 20 One of realization measures of this system includes means utilizing any merit of the public key encryption system and the common key encryption system to encrypt secret information in the form of enveloped data for the purpose of secrecy of a file and a communication path.

An example in which a reference person A and a preparation person B own secret information jointly is now described. (1) Even when an illegal person obtains enveloped data, contents thereof cannot be decrypted as far as the 25 illegal person cannot obtain a secret key of the reference person. (2) The efficiency of the realization measures using the enveloped data format capable of decrypting a plaintext at a high speed is exhibited.

In the following description, a public key of a user A is described as Usr_{Apub} , a secret key is described as Usr_{Apri} , and a common key (data key) for encrypting and decrypting a plaintext m is described as S . Further, to encrypt data X by means of a key K is described as $E[K](X)$ and to decrypt data Y by means of a key Y is described as $D[K](Y)$.

30 (1) The preparation person B prepares the common key S at random.

(2) The preparation person B encrypts the plaintext m by means of the data key S .

(3) The preparation person B encrypts the data key S used in (2) by means of the public key Usr_{Apub} of the reference person A.

35 (4) The preparation person B transmits data $E[Usr_{Apub}](S) \parallel E[S](m)$ (hereinafter referred to as enveloped data) in which the ciphertext $E[S](m)$ obtained in (2) and the data key $E[Usr_{Apub}](S)$ encrypted in (3) are combined with each other.

(5) The reference person A receives the enveloped data of (4).

40 (6) The reference person A decrypts the data key S from $E[Usr_{Apub}](S)$ of the enveloped data by means of the secret key Usr_{Apri} of the reference person A.

(7) The reference person A decrypts the ciphertext $E[S](m)$ of the enveloped data by means of the data key S decrypted in (6) to obtain the plaintext m .

45 When there are a plurality of reference persons (reference persons A and C), the above steps (3) and (4) can be extended as described below. The procedure for the plurality of reference persons can be extended easily. Further, a total amount of data can be reduced as compared with the case where data $E[Usr_{Apub}](S) \parallel E[S](m)$ and $E[Usr_{Cpub}](S) \parallel E[S](m)$ are separately produced for the reference persons A and C, respectively.

50 (3)' The public key Usr_{Apub} of the reference person A and the public key Usr_{Cpub} of the reference person C are used to encrypt the data key S .

(4)' The enveloped data $E[Usr_{Apub}](S) \parallel E[Usr_{Cpub}](S) \parallel E[S](m)$ for the encrypted data keys $E[Usr_{Apub}](S)$ and $E[Usr_{Cpub}](S)$ and the ciphertext $E[S](m)$ combined with each other is transmitted.

2. KEY RECOVERY SYSTEM

55 There is the possibility that secret information cannot be recovered because of loss of a key or moving out of an owner of a key. Particularly, it is an economical loss that the secret information cannot be recovered when the secret information is used in the activity of an enterprise.

It is effective against the above problem to provide a system (key recovery system) in which a copy of a key is backed up or stored in a computer installed in a corporation and the key is recovered from the copy thereof.

The key recovery system is composed of a plurality of computer apparatuses including a user security apparatus (abbreviated to USC), a key storage apparatus (abbreviated to KSC), a key registration apparatus (abbreviated to KRC), a data recovery apparatus (abbreviated to DRC) and the like. In the following description, the subset procedure for data recovery, that is, the procedure for causing the system to restore a pair of public key and secret key and recovery of an encryption key to be left to a user's responsibility is not named data recovery but is named key recovery (Both of them are discriminated from each other functionally, while the abbreviation of DRC indicating the data recovery apparatus is used in common to the key recovery apparatus in order to discriminate it from the key registration apparatus).

Generally, the key recovery system protects a key to provide for recovery of the key by using the following method:

- Keys are backed up in a key storage apparatus in which security against trouble is ensured as compared with a user security apparatus.
- The key is divided or split to be kept in separate key storage apparatuses in custody.
- When the keys are transferred between the user security apparatus and the key storage apparatus, the keys are encrypted by another key.

In addition, when a secret key of a public key is protected, a conventional key recovery system includes the following key recovery system.

- Split and restoration of a secret key using the secret sharing (hereinafter referred to as SS).
- Verification of split of the secret key using the verifiable secret sharing (hereinafter referred to as VSS).
- Restoration of the secret key using the blind decryption.

The above-mentioned key recovery technique concerning the user's secret key is known in, for example, Silvio Micali, "Fair Cryptosystems", MIT/LCS/TR-579. c, Laboratory for Computer Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, August 1994. Further, contents of the technique are disclosed in USP Nos. 5,276,737 and 5,315,658 and JP-A-8-506217.

The cryptograph technique used in the conventional key recovery system is now described in brief and the scope of the key recovery system is made clear.

(a) Split and Restoration of a Secret Key using the SS Technique

First, the secret sharing (SS) is described. The secret sharing is a cryptograph technique having the following procedure:

- (1) A distributor splits a secret S into n partial information pieces and delivers them to n custodians, respectively.
- (2) The n custodians gather each bringing the respective partial information pieces (S_1, S_2, \dots, S_n) so that the original secret S can be restored. At this time, it is assured that when any illegal person is present in the custodians, the original secret S cannot be restored even if any partial information piece S_i is used.

Further, as enhancement of the SS technique, the secret sharing capable of restoring the secret S by using any k pieces of the partial information pieces (S_1, S_2, \dots, S_n) is named SS technique based on (k, n) threshold method.

The conventional key recovery system to which the SS technique is applied is next described.

A procedure of a key recovery protocol (a) in the user security apparatus, the key storage apparatus and the key recovery apparatus is described.

The key recovery protocol (a) includes the following procedure:

- (a1) Backup of key that split secret keys Usr_{Apri} ($i = 1, \dots, n$) in the user security apparatus USC are kept in the key storage apparatuses KSC_i ($i = 1, \dots, n$) in custody.
- (a2) Recovery of the secret key that the split secret keys Usr_{Apri} kept in the key storage apparatuses KSC_i in custody are gathered to the key recovery apparatus DRC in which the secret key Usr_{Apri} of the user A is reconstructed.

KEY RECOVERY PROTOCOL (a)

- Backup of Key:

- (1) The user security apparatus USC splits the secret key Usr_{Apri} of the user A into n key pieces.
- (2) The user security apparatus USC transmits the split secret key Usr_{Apri_i} to the key storage apparatus KSC_i .
- (3) The key storage apparatus KSC_i keeps the received split secret key Usr_{Apri_i} in custody.
- (4) The above steps (2) and (3) are repeated between the user security apparatus USC and the key storage apparatuses KSC_i by the division or split number n .

• Recovery of Secret Key:

- (5) The key recovery apparatus DRC requests the split secret key Usr_{Apri_i} to the key storage apparatus KSC_i .
- (6) The key storage apparatus KSC_i searches its own apparatus and returns the split secret key Usr_{Apri_i} to the key recovery apparatus DRC.
- (7) The key recovery apparatus DRC receives the split secret key Usr_{Apri_i} in response to (5).
- (8) The above steps (5) to (7) are repeated between the key recovery apparatus DRC and the key storage apparatuses KSC_i by the split number n .
- (9) The key recovery apparatus DRC combines n split secret keys Usr_{Apri_i} to restore the secret key Usr_{Apri} .

(b) Split Method of Secret Key using VSS

First, the VSS is described.

The VSS is a cryptograph technique which uses the SS technique to allow the holder of the split partial information S_i to verify whether the split partial information S_i of the secret S is prepared exactly or not.

The key backup procedure of the key recovery protocol (a) has a problem that the key storage apparatus cannot previously confirm that the reconstructible split secret key is kept in custody. As one solution of this problem, a conventional key recovery system to which the VSS technique is applied is described.

The procedure of the key recovery protocol (b) in the user security apparatus, the key storage apparatus and the key recovery apparatus is described. The key recovery protocol (b) includes the following procedure:

(b1) Backup of keys that the key storage apparatus KSC_i ($i = 1, \dots, n$) keeps split public key Usr_{Apub_i} ($i = 1, \dots, n$) in custody in addition to the split secret key Usr_{Apri_i} ($i = 1, \dots, n$).

(b2) Verification of split of the key that the split public keys Usr_{Apub_i} kept in the key storage apparatus KSC_i in custody are gathered to the key recovery apparatus DRC in which the public key Usr_{Apub} of the user A is reconstructed. In this step (b2), the key recovery apparatus can verify split of the secret information (secret key) by means of the public information (public key) and it is considered that the secret information is prevented from leaking outside of the key storage apparatus.

KEY RECOVERY PROTOCOL (b)

• Backup of Key:

- (1) The user security apparatus USC splits the secret key Usr_{Apri} and the public key Usr_{Apub} of the user A into n pieces, respectively.
- (2) The user security apparatus USC transmits the split secret key Usr_{Apri_i} and the split public key Usr_{Apub_i} to the key storage apparatus KSC_i .
- (3) The key storage apparatus KSC_i keeps the received split secret key Usr_{Apri_i} and split public key Usr_{Apub_i} in custody.
- (4) The above steps (2) and (3) are repeated between the user security apparatus USC and the key storage apparatuses KSC_i by the split number n .

• Verification of Split Keys:

- (5) The key recovery apparatus DRC requests the split secret key Usr_{Apri_i} to the key storage apparatus KSC_i .
- (6) The key storage apparatus KSC_i searches its own apparatus and returns the split public key Usr_{Apub_i} paired with the split secret key Usr_{Apri_i} to the key recovery apparatus DRC.
- (7) The key recovery apparatus DRC receives the split public key Usr_{Apub_i} in response to (5).
- (8) The above steps (5) to (7) are repeated between the key recovery apparatus DRC and the key storage apparatuses KSC_i by the split number n .
- (9) The key recovery apparatus DRC combines the n split public keys Usr_{Apub_i} to restore the public key Usr_{Apub} .

(10) The fact that the secret key Usr_{Apri} is exactly split is verified indirectly by the fact that the public key Usr_{Apub} described in a public key certificate of the user A and prepared separately is coincident with the public key Usr_{Apub} restored in the step (9).

(c) Recovery of Secret Key using Blind Decryption

The blind decryption technique is a cryptograph technique that Alice who has obtained a ciphertext using a Bob's public key decrypts the ciphertext without recognition of contents of a plaintext thereof by the owner Bob of a key. The procedure of the blind decryption that Alice requests Bob to decrypt a ciphertext is described.

- (1) Alice encrypts $E[Usr_{Bpub}](m)$ by means of an Alice's public key Usr_{Apub} and transmits it to Bob.
- (2) Bob decrypts $E[Usr_{Apub}](E[Usr_{Bpub}](m))$ received from Alice by means of a Bob's secret key Usr_{Bpri} .
- (3) Bob calculates $D[Usr_{Bpri}](E[Usr_{Apub}](E[Usr_{Bpub}](m))) = E[Usr_{Apub}](D[Usr_{Bpri}](E[Usr_{Bpub}](m))) = E[Usr_{Apub}](m)$ on the assumption of utilization of any cryptograph algorithm having a result unchanged even if an order of calculation is changed.
- (4) Alice decrypts $E[Usr_{Apub}](m)$ received from Bob by means of Alice's secret key Usr_{Apri} to obtain a plaintext m .

The procedure of decrypting the secret key using the SS technique, described in (a) has a problem that an illegal person who has tapped communication between the key recovery apparatus and the key storage apparatus can conjecture the position of split secret keys required to reconstruct the secret key. As one solution of this problem, a conventional key recovery system to which the blind decryption technique is applied in addition to the SS technique is described.

The procedure of the key recovery protocol (c) in the user security apparatus, the key storage apparatus and the key recovery apparatus is described. The key recovery protocol (c) includes the following procedure:

- (c1) Backup of keys that split secret keys Usr_{Apri_i} ($i = 1, \dots, n$) are encrypted by means of public keys KSC_i ($i = 1, \dots, n$) of the key storage apparatuses and are kept in the key storage apparatuses KSC_i ($i = 1, \dots, n$).
- (c2) Recovery of secret key that reconstruction of the secret key Usr_{Apub} of the user A is concealed to the key storage apparatus KSC_i . In this step (c2), it is considered the reconstructed secret key information is prevented from leaking outside of the key recovery apparatus.

KEY RECOVERY PROTOCOL (c)

• Backup of keys:

- (1) The user security apparatus USC splits the secret key Usr_{Apri_i} of the user A into n pieces.
- (2) The user security apparatus USC encrypts the split secret key Usr_{Apri_i} by means of the public key KSC_{ipub} of each key storage apparatus KSC_i and transmits it.
- (3) The key storage apparatus KSC_i keeps the received $E[KSC_{ipub}](Usr_{Apri_i})$ in custody.
- (4) The above steps (2) and (3) are repeated between the user security apparatus USC and the key storage apparatus KSC by the split number n .

• Recovery of Secret Key

- (5) The key recovery apparatus DRC requests a plurality of split secret keys including the split secret keys $E[KSC_{ipub}](Usr_{Apri_i})$ of the user A to the key storage apparatuses KSC_i .
- (6) The key storage apparatuses KSC_i return the plurality of encrypted split secret keys including the split secret keys $E[KSC_{ipub}](Usr_{Apri_i})$ of the user A.
- (7) The key recovery apparatus DRC encrypts $E[DRCpub](Usr_{Apri_i})$ by means of the public key $DRCpub$ of the key recovery apparatus and transmits it to the key storage apparatus KSC_i .
- (8) The key storage apparatus KSC_i decrypts $E[DRCpub](E[KSC_{ipub}](Usr_{Apri_i}))$ by means of the secret key KSC_{ipri} of the key storage apparatus and transmits it to the key recovery apparatus DRC.
- (9) The key recovery apparatus DRC decrypts the received $D[KSC_{ipri}](E[DRCpub](E[KSC_{ipub}](Usr_{Apri_i})))$ by means of the secret key $DRCpri$ of the key storage apparatus to recover the split secret key Usr_{Apri_i} of the user A on the assumption that any cryptograph algorithm capable of calculating

$$\begin{aligned}
 & D[KSC_{i\text{pri}}] (E[DRC_{\text{pub}}] (E[KSC_{i\text{pub}}] (Usr_{A\text{pri}_i}))) \\
 & = E[DRC_{\text{pub}}] (D[KSC_{i\text{pri}}] (E[KSC_{i\text{pub}}] (Usr_{A\text{pri}_i}))) \\
 & = E[DRC_{\text{pub}}] (Usr_{A\text{pri}_i})
 \end{aligned}$$

is utilized.

(10) The key recovery apparatus DRC repeats the above steps (7) to (9) about the secret key $Usr_{A\text{pri}}$ of the user A between the key recovery apparatus and the key storage apparatuses KSC_i by the split number n .

(11) The key recovery apparatus DRC combines n split secret keys $Usr_{A\text{pri}_i}$ to reconstruct the user's secret key $Usr_{A\text{pri}}$.

The above-described conventional encrypted data recovery method has the following problems:

(1) There is the possibility that the restored secret key leaks to an illegal person during reconstruction of a lost secret key in the key recovery apparatus. There is the possibility that secret information is recovered unlimitedly without recognition of the user.

(2) There is a case where the key storage apparatus uses user's information (user's name, post, authentication information and the like) as one of measures for managing the plurality of split secret keys. In this case, there is the possibility that an illegal person intruding into a certain key storage apparatus can conjecture the position of another split secret key on the basis of a split secret key and the user's information. There is the possibility that the secret key is discovered by the illegal person without recognition of the user.

It is an object to provide a system including management means for taking the place of user's information in regard to split secret keys of a key storage apparatus and which does not require storage of the user's information in the key storage apparatus.

In order to achieve the above object, according to the present invention, the following solution system is provided.

In a key registration apparatus and a data recovery apparatus, as measures for preventing unlimited recovery of a secret using a reconstructed secret key, only a common key contained in enveloped data is adapted to be recovered without reconstruction of the secret key.

As measures for preventing conjecture of the user's secret key using user's information in the key storage apparatus, the user's information is adapted not to be stored in the key storage apparatus, and there are provided an identifier for key registration for relating the key registration apparatus to split secret keys of the key storage apparatuses, an identifier for key recovery for relating a data recovery apparatus to the split secret keys of the key storage apparatuses, and the same hash function for relating the identifier for key registration and an identifier for key storage to the same split secret keys.

More particularly, (1) as measures for preventing occurrence of unlimited secret recovery using the reconstructed secret key, the present invention provides an encrypted data recovery method comprising a step (data key recovery response) of partially recovering the data key encrypted by the public key in the enveloped data in each key storage apparatus by means of the split secret key of the key storage apparatus, and a step (data key recovery request) of combining a plurality of partially recovered data keys prepared for each key storage apparatus and decrypting the data key in the key recovery apparatus.

Particularly, in a preferred procedure of the present invention, the data key recovery response and the data key recovery request procedures in the encrypted data recovery method are realized using the blind decryption.

A system of the present invention comprises a key storage apparatus including a data recovery server 690 unit for decrypting the encrypted data key received from a data recovery client 660 unit by means of split secret keys kept in custody and a key recovery apparatus including a data recovery client 660 unit for transmitting the encrypted data key extracted from the enveloped data to a plurality of data recovery server 690 units and combining partially recovered data keys received from a plurality of data recovery servers 690 unit therewith to construct the data key.

(2) As measures for preventing conjecture of the user's secret key using the user's information in the key storage apparatus, the present invention provides an encrypted data recovery method comprising a step of preparing a key escrowed identifier by means of a random number in key registration response in case of backup of key, a step of calculating a storage key identifier by means of the key escrowed identifier and an identifier of the key storage apparatus in a key storage request, a step of keeping split secret keys in the key storage apparatuses in relation to the storage key identifier in key storage response, and a step of sending the key escrowed identifier to the user security apparatus in key registration response, a step of calculating the storage key identifier by means of the key escrowed identifier

sent to the user security apparatus and the identifier of the key storage apparatus in data recovery request in case of recovery of the key, and a step of searching for the split secret key kept in the key storage apparatus in custody by means of the calculated storage key identifier in data key recovery response.

Further, in a preferred procedure of the present invention, there is provided the encrypted data recovery method in which the step of sending the key escrowed identifier to the user security apparatus in the key registration response includes a step of issuing a public key certificate containing the key escrowed identifier.

Furthermore, in another preferred procedure of the present invention, there is provided the encrypted data recovery method in which the step of sending a first identifier to the user security apparatus in the key registration response includes a step of outputting at least one or more key escrowed identifiers to be stored, to a portable medium in relation to an output time of the identifier or information related to split of the secret key.

A system of the present invention comprises a key storage apparatus including a key registration server 640 unit for preparing a key escrowed identifier and notifying a receipt of the secret key to a key registration client 610 unit and a key storage client unit for preparing the storage key identifier from the key escrowed identifier and a key storage apparatus identifier 626, a key storage apparatus including a key storage server 670 unit for keeping the storage key identifier and the split secret key in relation to each other in custody and the data recovery server 690 unit using the split secret key related to the storage key identifier to decrypt the data key encrypted by the public key to prepare the partially recovered data key, and a key recovery apparatus including the data recovery client 660 unit for calculating the storage key identifier from the key escrowed identifier and the key storage apparatus identifier 626.

As described above, the encrypted data recovery method and system according to the present invention have the following features:

- (1) There is provided the key registration apparatus which intermediate between the user security apparatus and the key storage apparatus.
- (2) Only the data key is decrypted without reconstruction of split secret keys of the key storage apparatuses.

The key recovery system having such features possesses the following effects:

- (1) The convenience of the key escrowed operation is increased by intermediation of the reliable key registration apparatus.
- (2) Information relative to the user's secret key does not leak in the key recovery system.

In the drawings

Fig. 1 is a flow chart explaining the procedure that split secret keys encrypted by means of a public key of a key storage apparatus is delivered from a user security apparatus through a key registration apparatus to each key storage apparatus;

Fig. 2 is a flow chart explaining a data recovery procedure of the present invention in which partially recovered data keys are combined in communication between the data recovery apparatus and the key storage apparatus and split secret keys are not reconstructed in the data recovery apparatus;

Fig. 3 is a flow chart explaining the preparing procedure and the utilization procedure of the storage key identifier in the key registration;

Fig. 4 is a flow chart explaining a preparation procedure and the utilization procedure of a storage key identifier in registration of the key;

Fig. 5 is a flow chart explaining a procedure for management by a portable medium of a user security apparatus or a public key certificate for preparation of a plurality of key escrowed identifier in the key registration apparatus according to another embodiment of the present invention;

Figs. 6A and 6B are a block diagram schematically illustrating an encrypted data recovery system of the present invention;

Fig. 7 is a block diagram illustrating the key registration apparatus and the data recovery apparatus including a program for calculating the storage key identifier from the key escrowed identifier; and

Fig. 8 is a diagram explaining a relation of the present invention and a conventional cryptograph algorithm.

DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

Referring now to Fig. 8, an encrypted data recovery method of the present invention is described.

An encrypted data recovery system of the present invention includes a user security apparatus, a key registration apparatus, a key storage apparatus and a data recovery apparatus.

In step 801, a pair of public key Usr_{Apub} and secret key Usr_{Apri} of a user A is prepared in the user security

apparatus.

In step 802, the secret key Usr_{Apri} is backed up by the user A by using the user security apparatus, the key registration apparatus and the key storage apparatus and the user A receives a receipt in exchange therefor. Detailed procedure thereof is described later in steps 101 to 105 of Fig. 1.

In step 803, a message m is encrypted in the enveloped data format by means of a common key S and the public key Usr_{Apub} of the user A in the user security apparatus.

In step 804, the user A loses the secret key Usr_{Apri} accidentally.

In step 806, the message m is recovered by the user A by means of a data recovery apparatus, the key registration apparatus and the key storage apparatus. The present invention is characterized by the enveloped data and inputting of the receipt in step 802. Detailed procedure thereof is described later in step 201 to 205 of Fig. 2.

Contents of steps 801 and 803 are the conventional procedure in the cryptograph system. When the secret key is lost in step 804 and it is understood that the enveloped data of step 803 cannot be decrypted, countermeasure procedure by the user is made in step 805 and defensive procedure is made in step 802. Further, it is a matter of course that steps 802 and 803 may be exchanged with each other in accordance with the practical use of the cryptograph system.

The encrypted data recovery method and the system for realizing the method of the present invention are now described in relation to steps 802 and 805.

An embodiment of the present invention in which the data key is combined without reconstruction of the secret key is described in detail with reference to Figs. 6A and 6B.

Apparatuses constituting the encrypted data recovery system and programs including sub-programs operated in the apparatuses, that is, (1) a computer apparatus of the encrypted data recovery system, (2) an application program (AP) for performing registration operation of the secret key and recovery operation of data, and (3) a sub-program (key recovery library) called by the AP to perform key recovery function are described with reference to Figs. 6A and 6B.

(1) Apparatuses of Encrypted Data Recovery System

The encrypted data recovery system of the present invention includes a user security apparatus 600, a key registration apparatus 620, a key storage apparatus 670 and a data recovery apparatus 650 as shown in Figs. 6A and 6B.

The role of the user security apparatus 600 is to split the secret key of the user and request the key registration apparatus to register the split secret keys. Further, the role of the user security apparatus is to notify a key escrow identifier constituting response information to the registration request to the user.

The role of the key registration apparatus 620 is to request the key storage apparatus to keep the split secret key corresponding to the registration request from the user security apparatus in custody and further manage a certificate and the like of the key storage apparatus.

The role of the key storage apparatus 670 is to receive the storage request from the key storage apparatus and keep the split secret key in custody. Further, the role of the key storage apparatus is to receive a decryption request from the data recovery apparatus 650 and decrypt encrypted data key of the enveloped data by means of the split secret key.

The role of the data recovery apparatus 650 is to request the key storage apparatus to decrypt the encrypted data key of the enveloped data. Further, the role of the data recovery apparatus is to restore the data key from response information to the decryption request and decrypt an encrypted message of the enveloped data by using the decrypted data key to notify the message to the user.

(2) Configuration of Application Program

A key recovery application program (hereinafter referred to as application) performs registration operation of the secret key and recovery operation of data. The key recovery application can be classified into a client application (hereinafter referred to as client) which receives an input from the user and calls a key recovery library function to be operated and a server application (server) which calls the key recovery library function and waits for a request from the client to be operated.

Applications operated in the computer apparatus described in (1) are now enumerated.

(a) Key Registration Client 610: User security apparatus 600

This is a program for splitting the user's secret key and registering the split secret keys to the key registration apparatus when the user registers the user's own secret key. A key storage apparatus certificate list requiring function 611, a key splitting function 612, and a key registration requiring function 613 are called.

(b) Key Storage Apparatus Certificate Notification Server 630: Key Registration Apparatus 620

This is a program for taking out certificates of a required number of key storage apparatuses required by the key registration client 610 (key storage apparatus certificate notification client) from a key registration apparatus data base. A key storage apparatus certificate list response function 631 is called.

5 (c) Key Registration Server 640: Key Registration Apparatus 620

This is a program for transmitting the split secret keys received from the key registration client 610 to the key storage server 670 and notifying a receipt (key escrow identifier) to the key registration client 610. A key registration response function 641 and a key storage request function 642 are called.

10 (d) Key Storage Server 670: Key Storage Apparatus 670

This is a program for receiving the split secret keys from the key registration server 640 (key storage client) and keeping the received split secret keys in the key storage apparatus data base in custody. A key storage response function 681 is called.

15 (e) Data recovery Client 660: Data Recovery Apparatus 650

This is a program for taking out the encrypted data key from the enveloped data to send it to all of data recovery servers 690 and combining the data key from the received partial recovery data to recover the enveloped data. A key storage apparatus information list requiring function 661, a data key recovery requiring function 662 and a message recovery function 663 are called.

20 (f) Key Storage Apparatus Information Notifying Server 635: Key Registration Apparatus 620

This is a program for notifying information (key storage apparatus certificate, key storage apparatus address, key storage apparatus identifier) relative to the key storage apparatus to the data recovery client 660. A key storage apparatus information list response function 636 is called.

25 (g) Data Recovery Server 690: Key storage apparatus 670

This is a program for receiving the encrypted data key from the data recovery client 660 and decrypting the encrypted data key by means of a kept split secret key. A data key recovery response function 691 is called.

Data structures utilized by applications in the computer apparatus described in (1) are now enumerated.

30 (a) Key Registration Apparatus Data Base 629

This data base is provided in the key registration apparatus and manages items of an escrowed key identifier 622, a key storage apparatus certificate, a key storage apparatus address and a key storage apparatus identifier 626, which are the original copies for preparing the escrowed key identifier 622, a key storage apparatus certificate list 621 and a key storage apparatus information list 623. For simplification of description, one data base is used, while a plurality of data bases may be used in accordance with utilization objects.

35 (b) Key Storage Apparatus Data Base

This data base is provided in the key storage apparatus and manages items of storage keys 624 and storage key identifiers 625. The data base is characterized in that the storage key can be accessed while the storage key identifier is used as a retrieval condition.

(3) Structure of Sub-Programs of Encrypted Data Recovery System

45 The sub-program is a library of functional unit which is called by an application to perform the key recovery function. Description thereof is made for key registration and data recovery separately.

LIST OF FUNCTIONS USED IN KEY REGISTRATION

50 (1) Key Storage Apparatus Certificate List Requiring Function 611

- A necessary number of key storage apparatus certificates, an address of the key registration apparatus and a public key of a certification authority are inputted.
- A list of certificates of the key storage apparatuses is required to the key storage apparatus certificate list response function.
- 55 • The key storage apparatus certificate in the certificate list of the key storage apparatus is verified by means of the public key of the certification authority.
- Certificates of the necessary number and the storage key identifier which are responses to the list request are outputted as the key storage apparatus certificate list.

(2) Key Storage Apparatus Certificate List Response Function 631

- The key storage apparatus certificate list request is awaited.
- The key registration apparatus data base is accessed and the key storage apparatus certificate list (the necessary number of certificates of the key storage apparatus and the key storage apparatus identifier) is produced.
- The key storage apparatus certificate list is produced in response to the key storage apparatus certificate list request.

(3) Key Splitting Function 612

- The user's secret key and the key storage apparatus certificate list are inputted.
- A split secret key list (the user's secret key is divided by the number of certificates in the key storage apparatus certificate list) is produced.

(4) Key Registration Requiring Function 613

- The split secret key list, the key storage apparatus certificate list and the user's secret key are inputted.
- The public key of the key storage apparatus in the key storage apparatus certificate list is used to encrypt the split secret key in the split secret key list.
- The split secret key encrypted by means of the public key of the key storage apparatus and the storage key identifier are combined to produce a storage key list.
- Registration of the storage key list is required to the key registration response.
- The escrowed key information which is a response to the registration request is outputted.

(5) Key Registration Response Function 641

- The key registration request is awaited.
- The escrowed key identifier is produced and the escrowed key identifier is written in the key registration apparatus data base.
- The escrowed key identifier is produced in response to the key registration request.
- The key registration request information (storage key list and escrowed key identifier) is produced.

(6) Key Storage Requiring Function 642

- The key registration request information (storage key list and escrowed key identifier) is inputted.
- The storage key list and the escrowed key identifier in the key registration request information are taken out.
- The key registration apparatus data base is accessed to take out the key storage apparatus address and the key storage apparatus identifier.
- The storage key identifier is produced from the escrowed key identifier and the key storage apparatus identifier.
- Storage of the key storage request information (storage key and storage key identifier) is required to the key storage response.
- A storage result which is a response to the storage request is stored in the key registration apparatus data base.

(7) Key Storage Response Function 641

- The key storage request is awaited.
- The storage key identifier and the storage key are taken out from the key storage request information to be written in the key storage apparatus data base (stored in the state encrypted by the public key of the key storage apparatus).
- A storage result is notified to the key storage request.

LIST OF FUNCTIONS USED IN DATA RECOVERY

(8) Key Storage Apparatus Information List Requiring Function 661

- An address of the key registration apparatus and the public key of the certification authority are inputted.
- A list of the key storage apparatus information is required.

- The key storage apparatus certificate in the key storage apparatus information list is verified by means of the public key of the certification authority.
- The key storage apparatus information list which is a response to the list request is produced.

5 (9) Key Storage Apparatus Information List Response Function 636

- The key storage apparatus list request is awaited.
- The key storage apparatus data base is accessed to take out the key storage apparatus address and the key storage apparatus identifier.
- 10 • The key storage apparatus data base is accessed to take out the certificate of the key storage apparatus.
- The key storage apparatus information list is produced from the key storage apparatus address, the key storage apparatus identifier and the certificate of the key storage apparatus.
- The key storage apparatus information list is produced in response to the key storage apparatus information list request.

15

(10) Data Key Recovery Requiring Function 662

- The escrowed key identifier, the enveloped data and the key storage apparatus information list are inputted.
- Decryption of the encrypted data key in the enveloped data is required to each key storage apparatus.
- 20 • The split number of partially recovered data keys which are responses to the data key decryption request are combined to restore the data key.

(11) Data Key Recovery Response Function 691

- 25 • The data key decryption request is awaited.
- The data key decryption request (encrypted data key and storage key identifier) is used to search for the split secret keys stored in the key store apparatus data base.
- The secret key of the key storage apparatus is used to decrypt the searched split secret keys.
- The decrypted split secret keys are used to decrypt the data key of the data key decryption request. This
- 30 • decrypted data key is named a partially recovered data key.
- The partially recovered data key is produced in response to the data key decryption request.

(12) Message Recovery Function 663

- 35 • The enveloped data and the restored data key are inputted.
- The restored data key is used to decrypt the encrypted message in the enveloped data.

Next, the key registration procedure shown in Figs. 1 and 4 and the data recovery procedure shown in Figs. 2 and 3 in the computer illustrated in Figs. 6A and 6B are described.

Referring now to Figs. 1 and 4, the key registration procedure is described.

The key registration procedure (Fig. 1) of the present invention is characterized by processing contents of steps 121 and 131. Fig. 4 shows processing contents of step 121 for registration of the split secret key and steps 123 and 131 for delivery of the storage key 624 of the split secret key in Fig. 1 in detail.

- 45 • Step 101: Input the key registration apparatus address, the necessary number of key storage apparatus certificates and the user's secret key.

(1) The key registration apparatus address, the necessary number n of key storage apparatus certificates (= the split number k of the secret key) and the user's secret key Usr_{Apri} are inputted to the key registration client 610 of the user security apparatus.

- Step 102: Require the key storage apparatus certificate list.

(1) The key registration client 610 of the user security apparatus transmits the necessary number k of key storage apparatus certificates to the key storage apparatus certificate notifying server 630 of the key registration apparatus and requires the key storage apparatus certificate list.

(2) The key registration client 610 waits for a response of the key storage apparatus certificate notifying server 630.

(3) The key registration client 610 receives the key storage apparatus certificate list returned from the key storage apparatus certificate notifying server 630.

- Step 111: Notify the key storage apparatus certificate list.

(1) The key storage apparatus certificate list notifying server 630 of the key registration apparatus waits for the key storage apparatus certificate list notification request.

(2) The key storage apparatus certificate list notifying server 630 takes out a combination of the key storage apparatus certificate and the key storage apparatus identifier from the key registration data base by the necessary number k of key storage apparatus certificates and prepares the key storage apparatus certificate list.

(3) The key storage apparatus certificate list notifying server 630 transmits the key storage apparatus certificate list to the key registration client 610.

- Step 103: splitting of key.

(1) The key registration client 610 inputs the user's secret key and the key storage apparatus certificate list.

(2) The key registration client 610 splits the user's secret key by the number of certificates in the key storage apparatus certificate list and prepares the split secret key list.

- Step 104: Key registration request

(1) The key registration client 610 encrypts the split secret keys in the split secret key list by means of the public key of the key storage apparatus in the key storage apparatus certificate list.

(2) The key registration client 610 combines the split secret key encrypted by means of the public key of the key storage apparatus with the storage key identifier and prepares the storage key list.

(3) The key registration client 610 requires registration of the storage key list to the key registration response.

(4) The key registration client 610 produces the escrowed key identifier which is a response to the registration request.

- Step 121: Key registration response

(1) The key registration server 640 of the key registration apparatus waits for the key registration request.

(2) The key registration server 640 receives the key registration request (the storage key list $E[KSC_i, pub]$ ($U_{srA, pri}$) and the storage key apparatus identifier KSC_i-ID) (step 401).

(3) The key registration server 640 uses a random number to prepare the escrowed key identifier KR_A-ID (step 402).

(4) The key registration server 640 writes the escrowed key identifier KR_A-ID into the key registration apparatus data base (step 403).

(5) The key registration server 640 transmits the escrowed key identifier KR_A-ID to the key registration client 610.

- Step 122: Input the key storage apparatus information (key storage apparatus identifier 626).

(1) The key registration server 640 of the key registration apparatus takes out the key storage apparatus identifier from the storage key list obtained in step 121.

(2) The key registration server 640 accesses to the key registration apparatus data base to take out the key storage apparatus identifier.

(3) The key registration server 640 verifies that the key storage apparatus identifiers taken out in (1) and (2) are coincident with each other.

- Step 123: Key storage request

(1) The key registration server 640 of the key registration apparatus prepares a storage key identifier $SP_A^{KRCL-ID}$ from the escrowed key identifier KR_A-ID of step 121 and the key storage apparatus identifier $KRCi-ID$ of step 122 (step 411).

(2) The key registration server 640 transmits the storage key $E[KSC_i, pub](U_{srA, pri})$ and the storage key identifier $SP_A^{KRCL-ID}$ to the key storage server 670 of the key storage apparatus and requires storage of key (step 412).

(3) The key registration server 640 waits for a response from the key storage server 670 of each key storage

apparatus.

(4) The key registration server 640 confirms preservation of the storage key 624 of each key storage apparatus on the basis of a return result of (3) and deletes the storage key $E[KSC_{i, pub}](Usr_{A, pri_i})$ and the storage key identifier $SP_A^{KRCi-ID}$ (step 413).

(5) The key registration server 640 repeats the above procedures (1) to (4) by the split number k of the secret key.

- Step 131: Key storage response

(1) The key storage server 670 of the key storage apparatus KSC_i receives the storage key $E[KSC_{i, pub}](Usr_{A, pri_i})$ and the storage key identifier $SP_A^{KRCi-ID}$.

(2) The key storage server 670 of the key storage apparatus KSC_i relates the storage key $E[KSC_{i, pub}](Usr_{A, pri_i})$ to the storage key identifier $SP_A^{KRCi-ID}$ to be preserved.

- Step 105: Output the escrowed key identifier 606.

(1) The key registration client 610 of the user security apparatus outputs the escrowed key identifier obtained in step 104 onto a picture screen of the user security apparatus.

(2) The key registration client 610 preserves the escrowed key identifier in the user security apparatus or a portable medium in accordance with a user's approval response to the output to the picture screen of (1).

In the above description, the process proceeds to step 105 next to step 121 and the key registration processing is finished without waiting for the key storage processing in the key storage apparatus. Separately, steps 122, 123 and 131 are processed as batch processing. However, it is needless to say that processing until step 131 may be executed and the process may proceed to step 105 after the key storage in the key storage apparatus is confirmed.

Referring now to Figs. 2 and 3, the data recovery procedure of the present invention is described.

The data recovery procedure (Fig. 2) of the present invention is characterized by processing contents of steps 203 and 221. Fig. 3 shows step 203 in which encrypted data key is transmitted and step 221 in which data key is recovered partially in detail.

- Step 201: input the key registration apparatus address, the escrowed key identifier and the enveloped data

(1) The key registration apparatus address, the escrowed key identifier and the enveloped data are inputted to the data recovery client 660.

- Step 202: require the key storage apparatus information list 623

(1) The data recovery client 660 requires a list of the key storage apparatus information (the key storage apparatus address and the key storage apparatus identifier) from the key storage apparatus information notifying server 635 of the key storage apparatus.

(2) The data recovery client 660 waits for a response of the key storage apparatus information notifying server 635.

(3) The data recovery client 660 obtains the key storage apparatus information list returned from the key storage apparatus information notifying server 635.

- Step 211: notify the key storage apparatus information list

(1) The key storage apparatus information notifying server 635 of the key registration apparatus accesses to the key registration apparatus data base to take out all of available key storage apparatus information and prepares the key storage apparatus information list.

(2) The key storage apparatus information notifying server 635 notifies the key storage apparatus information list to the data recovery client 660.

- Step 203: require the data key recovery.

(1) The data recovery client 660 extracts $E[Usr_{A, pub}](S)$ in the enveloped data 653 (step 301).

(2) The data recovery client 660 calculates the storage key identifier from the escrowed key identifier KR_A-ID of step 201 and the key storage apparatus identifier KSC_i-ID of step 202 (step 302).

(3) The data recovery client 660 transmits the encrypted data key $E[Usr_{Apub}](S)$ and the storage key identifier to the data recovery server 690 of the key storage apparatus KSC_i and requires the data recovery server 690 to decrypt the data key (step 303).

(4) The data recovery client 660 waits for a response from the data recovery server 690.

(5) The data recovery client 660 repeats the above procedures (2) to (4) by the number n of the key storage apparatuses.

(6) The data recovery client 660 obtains $D[Usr_{Apri_i}](E[Usr_{Apub}](S)) = S_i$ returned by the data recovery server 690 of the key storage apparatus KSC_i (step 304).

(7) The data recovery client 660 uses a necessary number k of data keys to combine S_i ($i = 1, \dots, k$) and reconstructs the data key S .

• Step 221: data key recovery response

(1) The data recovery server 690 of the key storage apparatus KSC_i receives the encrypted data key $E[Usr_{Apub}](S)$ and the storage key identifier $SP_A^{KRCI-ID}$ (step 311).

(2) The data recovery server 690 accesses to the key storage apparatus data base and searches for the storage key $E[KSC_{ipub}](Usr_{Apri_i})$ on the condition of the storage key identifier $SP_A^{KRCI-ID}$ of (1) (step 312).

(3) The data recovery server 690 decrypts the storage key $E[KSC_{ipub}](Usr_{Apri_i})$ by means of the public key KSC_{ipri} of the key storage apparatus KSC_i (step 313).

(4) The data recovery server 690 decrypts $E[Usr_{Apub}](S)$ by means of the split secret key Usr_{Apri_i} (step 314).

(5) The data recovery server 690 returns partially recovered data key $D[Usr_{Apri_i}](E[Usr_{Apub}](S)) = S_i$ to the data recovery client 660 (step 315).

(6) The data recovery server 690 re-encrypts the split secret key Usr_{Apri_i} by means of the public key KSC_{ipub} of the key storage apparatus KSC_i .

• Step 204: Recover message.

(1) The data recovery client 660 extracts the ciphertext $E(S)$ (m) in the enveloped data.

(2) The data recovery client 660 decrypts the ciphertext $E[S](m)$ by means of the data key S .

• Step 205: Output message.

(1) The data recovery client 660 outputs a plaintext m .

In the above description, the data recovery client 660 of the data recovery apparatus and the data recovery server 690 of each key storage apparatus are operated in parallel, while they may be operated in the sequence manner.

In the above description, the split number k of the secret key is equal to the number n of the key storage apparatuses, that is, the secret key is split so that split secret keys are stored in all of the key storage apparatuses. Next, processing in case where both of the numbers are not coincident with each other is described.

• In case where the number n of the key storage apparatuses is larger than the split number k of the secret keys ($n > k$):

In step 221, the data recovery server 690 of the key storage apparatus which does not keep the split secret key in custody is unsuccessful in retrieval of the split secret key Usr_{Apri_i} using the storage key identifier. The data recovery server 690 returns "an empty key" to the data recovery client 660. The failure in the retrieval is caused by use of a unique storage key identifier produced from a unique escrowed key identifier and a unique key storage apparatus identifier.

In step 203, the data recovery client 660 of the data recovery apparatus combines the data key by using partially recovered data keys except the "empty key".

• In case where the number n of the key storage apparatuses is smaller than the split number k of the secret keys ($n < k$):

In step 203, the data recovery client 660 of the data recovery apparatus cannot get n data keys partially recovered and is unsuccessful in reconstruction of the data key, so that processing is finished unusually. It is needless to say that the SS technique based on the threshold method described in the prior art is used to split the key and the data key may be reconstructed with the number n of the key storage apparatuses.

Embodiment to which the Blind Decryption is Applied:

In another embodiment of the present invention, the blind decryption described in the prior art is applied in steps 203 and 204 described above.

In a known example, the blind decryption is applied in order to conceal the secret key recovered by the key recovery apparatus against each key storage apparatus. On the contrary, in the present invention, the blind decryption is applied in order to conceal contents (partially recovered data keys) of data key recovered by the key recovery apparatus against each key storage apparatus.

The procedure of the present invention is now described.

- Step 203': this step is different from step 203 in that procedures of (2) and (8) are added.

(1) The data recovery client 660 extracts $E[Usr_{Apub}](S)$ in the enveloped data.

(2) The data recovery client 660 encrypts $E[Usr_{Apub}](S)$ by means of the public key DRC_{pub} of the data recovery apparatus.

(3) The data recovery client 660 calculates the just storage key identifier from the escrowed key identifier 652 of step 201 and the key storage apparatus identifier 626 of step 202.

(4) The data recovery client 660 transmits the encrypted data key $E[Usr_{Apub}](E[Usr_{Apub}](S))$ and the storage key identifier of (3) to the data recovery server 690 of the key storage apparatus KSC_i and requires the data recovery server 690 to decrypt the data key.

(5) The data recovery client 660 waits for a response from the data recovery server 690.

(6) The data recovery client 660 repeats the above procedures (3) to (5) by the number n of the key storage apparatuses.

(7) The data recovery client 660 obtains $E[DRC_{pub}](S_i)$ returned by the data recovery server 690 of the key storage apparatus KSC_i .

(8) The data recovery client 660 decrypts $E[DRC_{pub}](S_i)$ by means of the secret key DRC_{pri} and takes out S_i .

(9) The data recovery client 660 uses a necessary number k of data keys to combine S_i ($i = 1, \dots, k$) and reconstructs the data key S .

- Step 221': this step is different from step 221 in that contents of S_i are concealed against the key storage apparatus KSC_i .

(1) The data recovery server 690 of the key storage apparatus KSC_i receives the encrypted data key $E[DRC_{pub}](E[Usr_{Apub}](S))$ and the storage key identifier.

(2) The data recovery server 690 accesses to the key storage apparatus data base and searches for the storage key $E[KSC_{ipub}](Usr_{Apri})$ on the condition of the storage key identifier of (1).

(3) The data recovery server 690 decrypts the storage $E[KSC_{ipub}](Usr_{Apri})$ by means of the secret key KSC_{ipri} of the key storage apparatus KSC_i .

(4) The data recovery server 690 decrypts $E[DRC_{pub}](E[Usr_{Apub}](S))$ by means of the split secret key Usr_{Apri} .
 $D[Usr_{Apri}](E[DRC_{pub}](E[Usr_{Apub}](S))) = E[DRC_{pub}](D[Usr_{Apri}](E[Usr_{Apub}](S))) = E[DRC_{pub}](S)$

(5) The data recovery server 690 returns partially recovered data key $E[DRC_{pub}](S_i)$ to the data recovery client 660.

(6) The data recovery server 690 re-encrypts the split secret key Usr_{Apri} by means of the secret key KSC_{ipub} of the key storage apparatus KSC_i .

Procedure and Apparatus for Preparing the Escrowed Key Identifier and the Storage Key Identifier:

A preparation procedure, a utilization procedure and a preparation apparatus of the escrowed key identifier and the storage key identifier which are elements for realizing the present invention described above are now described with reference to Figs. 7, 3 and 4.

First, the preparation apparatus of the escrowed key identifier and the storage key identifier is described. Referring to Fig. 7 showing a portion of Figs. 6A and 6B in detail, a place and function of the preparation apparatus of the escrowed key identifier and the storage key identifier are described.

The key registration response function 641 of the key registration apparatus includes a random number generating unit 700 for generating the escrowed key identifier 622 and a receipt notifying unit 750 for notifying the receipt of the secret key to the key registration requiring function 613 of the user security apparatus.

The key storage requiring function 642 of the key registration apparatus includes a one-way hash function unit 710 supplied with the escrowed key information 622 produced by the random number generating unit 700 and the key

storage apparatus identifier 626 and for producing the storage key identifier 625.

The key storage response function 681 of the key storage apparatus includes a key storage unit 740 in which the storage key identifier 625 produced by the hash function unit 710 and the storage key 624 are related and stored.

The data key recovery requiring function 662 of the data recovery apparatus includes an enveloped data extracting unit 720 supplied with the enveloped data 653 and for producing an encrypted data key 654, and a one-way hash function unit 710 supplied with the escrowed key identifier 652 and the key storage apparatus identifier 626 and for producing the storage key identifier 655. Further, the data key recovery requiring function 662 includes a data key combining unit 721 supplied with a plurality of partially recovered data keys 671 produced by the data key recovery response function 691 and for producing the data key 658.

The data key recovery response function 691 of the key storage apparatus includes a storage key searching unit 730 supplied with the encrypted data key 654 and the storage key identifier 655 produced by the one-way hash function unit 710 and for searching the key storage apparatus data base 671.

The preparation procedure of the escrowed key identifier and the storage key identifier in each preparation apparatus is next described. The random number generating unit 700 is, for example, a pseudo-random bit generator (a function thereof is described as $g(x)$) for generating a stream of random bits. The hash function 710 is a function that produces a different value for inputs x_1 and x_2 having different values ($h(x_1) \neq h(x_2)$). In addition, the one-way hash function is a hash function that performs conversion so that an input x cannot be found out from a value of an output $h(x)$.

In the embodiment, the key registration response function 641, the key storage requiring function 622 and the data key recovery response function 662 are realized by software. The random number generating unit 700 and the one-way hash function unit 710 can be also realized easily by calling the function of the software cryptograph library. Accordingly, the random number generating unit 700 is used to call the random number generating function which is a core of the key preparing function of the cryptograph library, for example, so that the escrowed key identifier can be prepared. The one-way hash function 710 is used to call the hash function which is a core of message digest function, so that the storage key identifier can be prepared.

Finally, the utilization procedure of the escrowed key identifier and the storage key identifier is described.

The data key recovery is based on the double security design principle that when a user is just the user can input the escrowed key identifier 652 equal to an output 606 upon registration of the secret key and when the just key registration apparatus and data recovery apparatus are used the key storage apparatus identifier 626 equal to that upon registration of the secret key can be obtained. The key storage apparatus identifier 626 is utilized on the condition that the pertinent storage key 624 is searched in the key storage apparatus data base by utilizing the properties of the hash.

In Fig. 4, the preparation procedure of the escrowed key identifier 622 (step 402) and the storage key identifier (step 411) in the key registration server 640 of the key registration apparatus and the utilization procedure (step 422) of the storage key identifier in the key storage server 670 of the key storage apparatus are shown.

In Fig. 3, the preparation procedure (step 302) of the storage key identifier in the data recovery client 660 of the data recovery apparatus and the utilization procedure (step 312) of the storage key identifier in the data recovery server 690 of the key storage apparatus are shown.

In step 302, a unique KR_A -ID indicating the escrowed key identifier 652 issued upon registration of the secret key $Usr_{A_{pri}}$ of the user A and a unique KSC_i -ID indicating the key storage apparatus KSC_i are inputted and the hash function $h()$ is used to produce a unique key storage apparatus identifier 626 $SP_A^{KSC_i}$ -ID in the key storage apparatus KSC_i . In step 312, the key storage apparatus identifier 626 $SP_A^{KSC_i}$ -ID is used to search the split secret key $Usr_{A_{pri}}$ of the user A in the key storage apparatus data base of the desired key storage apparatus KSC_i .

Management Method of the Escrowed Key Identifier:

As described above, in the present invention, since the split secret key referred indirectly from the escrowed key identifier can be used to realize the key recovery, management of the escrowed key identifier is important. It is supposed that the user security apparatus is failed, for example, as a cause of loss of the key and as a further embodiment of the present invention the following two kinds of management methods are provided:

- (1) The escrowed key identifier is stored as a part of data difficult to be altered (for example, the public key certificate).
- (2) The escrowed key identifier is stored in a medium (for example, IC card) having the robust characteristic against trouble and separable from the user security apparatus. As shown in Fig. 5, when the key registration apparatus has the function of the certification authority, the public key certificate of (1) is outputted, otherwise the escrowed key identifier in the respective management methods, stored in the medium is outputted.

The present invention is not limited to the disclosed embodiments and includes various modifications contained in the spirit of the claims.

Claims

1. An encrypted data recovery method in a system including a user security apparatus (600) for encrypting a message by means of a data key, preparing enveloped data for encrypting said data key by means of a public key and splitting a secret key paired with said public key, a plurality of key storage apparatuses (670) each keeping each of said split secret keys in custody, a key registration apparatus (620) for managing key storage apparatus certificates and key storage information, and a key recovery apparatus (650) for decrypting said data key by means of said split secret keys and said enveloped data, said system connected to said user security apparatus, said key registration apparatus, said key storage apparatus and said key recovery apparatus through a network, comprising:
 - a key registration requiring step (104) of encrypting said split secret keys by means of said public key of said key storage apparatus (670) and requiring registration;
 - a key registration response step (121) of registering said required split secret keys;
 - a key storage response step (131) of keeping each of said registered split secret keys in each of said key storage apparatuses in custody;
 - a data key recovery response step (221) of partially decrypting said data key encrypted by said public key of a user and contained in said enveloped data by means of said split secret keys of said key storage apparatuses, and
 - a data key recovery request step (203) of combining a plurality of partial recovery data keys prepared for each of said key storage apparatuses to decrypt said data key.
2. An encrypted data recovery method according to Claim 1, wherein said data key recovery request step (203) and said data key recovery response step (221) each include a step of decrypting said data key by means of the blind decryption method.
3. An encrypted data recovery method according to Claim 1, wherein said key registration response step (121) includes a step (402) of preparing a first identifier by means of a random number, and
 - a key storage request step (123) includes a step (411) of preparing a second identifier by means of said first identifier and an identifier of said key storage apparatus,
 - said key storage response step (131) including a step (422) of keeping said split secret key in said key storage apparatus in custody in relation to said second identifier,
 - said key registration response step (121) including a step (404) for sending said first identifier to said user security apparatus,
 - said data recovery request step (203) including a step (302) of calculating said second identifier by means of said first identifier sent to said user security apparatus and said identifier of said key storage apparatus,
 - said data recovery response step (221) including a step (312) of using said calculated second identifier to search for said split secret key kept in said key storage apparatus in custody.
4. An encrypted data recovery method according to Claim 3, wherein said step (404) of sending said first identifier to said user security apparatus includes a step of issuing a public key certificate containing said first identifier.
5. An encrypted data recovery method according to Claim 3, wherein said step (404) of sending said first identifier to said user security apparatus including a step of outputting said first identifier to a portable medium in relation to an output time of identifier or information relative to division of said secret key.
6. An encrypted data recovery system comprising a user security apparatus (600) for preparing enveloped data, a key registration apparatus (620), a key storage apparatus (670) and a key recovery apparatus (650);
 - said user security apparatus (600) including;
 - key registration client means (610) for requiring (611) a key storage apparatus certificate (621) and splitting (612) a secret key of a user to register said split secret keys in said key registration apparatuses (620);
 - said key registration apparatus (620) including:
 - key storage certificate notifying server means (630) for producing (631) said key storage apparatus certificate (621) in response to said requirement thereof;
 - key registration server means (640) for issuing (641) receipts (622) of said split secret keys and transmitting (642) received split secret keys (605) to a plurality of key storage server means (680); and
 - key storage apparatus information notifying server means (635) for producing (636) key storage apparatus

information (623);

said key storage apparatus (670) including:

key storage server means (680) for keeping (681) received split secret keys (624) in custody; and

5 data recovery server means (690) for receiving an encrypted data key (654) from data recovery client means (660) to decrypt said encrypted data key by means of said kept split secret keys (624) and returning partially recovered data key (671) to said data recovery client means (660);

said key recovery apparatus (650) including:

10 data recovery client means (660) for requiring (661) said key storage apparatus information to said key storage certificate notifying server means (630) and transmitting (662) said encrypted data key (654) contained in said enveloped data (653) to a plurality of said data recovery server means (690), combining said data key (656) from a plurality of said partially recovered data keys (671) returned by said data recovery server means to decrypt a ciphertext contained in said enveloped data by means of said combined data key.

- 15 7. An encrypted data recovery system according to Claim 6, wherein said key registration server means (640) includes:

means for preparing (700) a first identifier;

means (750) for notifying a receipt (606) of said secret key to said key registration client means (610); and

20 means (710) for preparing a second identifier from said first identifier and a key storage apparatus identifier (626); and

said key storage server means (680) includes:

means (740) for keeping said second identifier and said split secret key in relation to each other in custody;

said data recovery client means (660) including:

25 means (710) for calculating said second identifier from said receipt (606) of said secret key and said key storage apparatus identifier (626);

said data recovery server means (690) including:

30 means for searching for said split secret key (624) related to said second identifier (655) sent from said data recovery client means (660).

FIG.1




FIG.2




FIG.3


DATA RECOVERY APPARATUSKEY STORAGE APPARATUS

FIG.4

KEY REGISTRATION APPARATUS

KEY STORAGE APPARATUS





FIG.5







FIG. 6A

FIG. 6B







FIG.8





(19)



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(11)

EP 0 869 635 A3

(12)

EUROPEAN PATENT APPLICATION

(88) Date of publication A3:
13.09.2000 Bulletin 2000/37

(51) Int Cl.7: H04L 9/08

(43) Date of publication A2:
07.10.1998 Bulletin 1998/41

(21) Application number: 98302438.1

(22) Date of filing: 30.03.1998

(84) Designated Contracting States:
AT BE CH DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT LI LU MC
NL PT SE
Designated Extension States:
AL LT LV MK RO SI

(30) Priority: 31.03.1997 JP 80008197

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
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(54) Encrypted data recovery method using split storage key and system thereof

(57) When a secret is encrypted and stored, it is necessary to provide for a countermeasure for lost key (key recovery system). In the present invention, a key recovery system for an enveloped data format in which a common key is used to encrypt a plaintext (secret) and a user's public key is used to encrypt the common key and attached to an encrypted text is provided. In the present invention, only the common key is decrypted (203, 221) to recover the secret (204) without reconstruction of split secret keys kept in a plurality of key storage apparatuses.

FIG.2





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EUROPEAN SEARCH REPORT

Application Number
EP 98 30 2438

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X	DESMEDT Y G: "THRESHOLD CRYPTOGRAPHY" EUROPEAN TRANSACTIONS ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND RELATED TECHNOLOGIES, IT, AEI, MILANO, vol. 5, no. 4, 1 July 1994 (1994-07-01), pages 35-43, XP000460560 ISSN: 1120-3862 * page 36, left-hand column, paragraph 4 - right-hand column, paragraph 2 * * page 37, right-hand column, paragraph 6 - page 38, left-hand column, paragraph 4 * * page 38, right-hand column, paragraph 7 - page 39, right-hand column, paragraph 6 *	1,6	H04L9/08
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Place of search BERLIN		Date of completion of the search 17 July 2000	Examiner Carnerero Álvaro, F
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EPO FORM 1503 03/92 (F04C01)

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EP 98 30 2438

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